The Theory and Practice of International Fishery Development-Management by Chapman, Wilber M.
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL FISHERY
D EVELOPMENT-MANA GEM ENT
Dr. Wilbert McLeod Chapman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Disputes among nations arising from problems of jurisdiction
over fisheries are not new. They have had a powerful and
continuing effect on the formation of the modern Law of the Sea
at least from the 16th century to the present.' History records
numerous interactions arising among European nations out of the
fisheries of the North Sea and Baltic Sea particularly. These
disputes, as did many others, followed the Europeans to the New
World and international law was further .shaped by arbitrations
of fishery disputes arising from the Grand Bank and Bering Sea
Fisheries during the 19th century
For a very long while, in terms of modern history, the roots
for such disputes were to be found principally in attempts to gain,
or retain, special privileges for one national group over another
in a particular fishery. This is still a root cause for controversy
among nations over fisheries, but during the 20th century global
communication has improved so that world opinion can be rallied
rather quickly on issues affecting the general peace. It has become
increasingly difficult for one nation to move unilaterally
effectively in excluding, or hampering, the operations of fishermen
of other nations in the high seas simply to gain preferential
advantage in that fishery for its- own nationals. Such actions tend
to provide the offending nation with a bad international public
image, which is not beneficial diplomatically in these times.
The idea of conservation, and the necessity to limit fishing
effort in order to prevent over-fishing, also is not new to this
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1. See, Heinzen, The Three-mile Limit in Preserving the Freedom of tile Seas, I I
STAN. L. REV. 597 (1959).
2. See Tomasevich, International Agreements on Conservation of Marine Resources
(1943) (Food Research Institute, Stanford University, California).
THEOR Y A ND PRACTICE
century. As early as 1278 (at least in England) the regulation of
fisheries more or less for this purpose was being practiced.' At
about the end of the 19th century, opinion among marine
scientists began to crystalize along the lines that the regulation of
fishing effort would, under certain circumstances, produce more
fish with less effort from a particular fishery than would
unregulated fishing effort.4 The first mathematical model of the
relationship between the vital processes (reproduction, growth and
mortality) of the fish population and the yield of the fishery was
published by Baranov in 1918.-
During the next 20 years, thinking and experience concerning
the conservation of high seas fisheries was materially extended by
such scientists as Russell' (1931) and Graham7 (1935 and 1939)
in England, Hjort and others' (1933) in Norway, and Thompson
and Bell' (1934) in North America. Shortly after the end of World
War II the great spurt forward in fishing effort on the sea led to
sharply expanded scientific study of these questions and extension
and improvement of the mathematical theory originated by
Baranov in the Northeast Atlantic area, 10 in the tropical Eastern
Pacific" and elsewhere.
2
3. See Graham, Concepts of Conservation, Papers, International Technical
Conference for Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea 1-13, United Nations
A/Conf. 10/7 (1955).
4. See, e.g. Petersen, 4 The Decrease of our Flatfish Fisheries (1894) (Danish
Biological Station Report, Copenhagen).
5. Baronov, I On the Question of the Biological Foundation of Fisheries 81-128
(1918) (Text in Russian, Nauchnyi lssledovatel'skii lkhtogicheskii Institut, Izvesta,
Moscow).
6. Russell, Some Theoretical Considerations on the Overfishing Problem, 6 JOURNAL
DE CONSEIL, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR EXPLORATION OF THE SEA 3 (1931)
(Copenhagen).
7. Graham, Modern Theory of Exploiting a Fishery, and Applications to North Sea
Trawling, 10 JOUR. CONS. PERM. INT. POUR I'EXPLORATION DE LA MER 274-74 (1935)
(Copenhagen); Graham, The Sigmoid Curve and the Overfishing Problem, 110 RAPPORTS
ET PROCESVERBAUX DE REUNIONS, CONS. PERM. INT. POUR I'EXPLORATION DE LA MER
17-20 (1939) (Copenhagen).
8. Hjort, John, & Ottestad, The Optimum Catch, 7 HVALRADETS SKRIFTER 1-92
(1933) (Oslo).
9. Thompson & Bell, Biological Studies of the Pacific Halibut Fishery; 2 Effect of
Changes in Intensity Upon Yield and Yield Per Unit of Gear 1-49 (1934) (International
Fishing Commission Report number 8).
10. See Hulme, Beverton, and Holt, Population Studies in Fisheries Biology, 159
NATURE 714-15 (1947) (London).
II. See Schaefer, The Scientific Basis for a Conservation Programme, and Scientific
Investigation of the Tropical Tuna Resources of the Eastern Pacific, Papers, International
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The continued expansion of fishing effort led to exacerbated
and wide spread interactions over fishery jurisdiction in many
parts of the world after 1945. The International Law Commission
undertook a study of the whole subject of the Law of the Sea at
its first session in 1947 and continued prosecuting that inquiry for
the next 10 years. This led to the United Nations' sponsored
"International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the
Living Resources of the Sea" in Rome in the Spring of 1955, and
two United Nations' sponsored conferences on the Law of the Sea
held in Geneva in 1958 and 1960.13
There arose from the 1958 conference 4 four conventions
which were opened for ratification and have subsequently come
into force. One of these, the Convention on the High Seas, set out
the right of all nations to fish on the high seas (Article 2), with
only one qualification: that this freedom of fishing should be
exercised by all nations with reasonable regard to the interests of
other nations in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas. The
companion convention, Convention of Fishing and Conservation
of the Living Resources of the High Seas, defined this freedom
more specifically in its two initial articles, as follows:
Article I
1. All States have the right for their nationals to engage
in fishing on the high seas, subject (a) to their treaty
obligations, (b) to the interests and rights of coastal States as
provided for in this convention, and (c) to the provisions
contained in the following articles concerning conservation of
the living resources of the high seas.
2. All States have the duty to adopt, or to cooperate
with other States in adopting, such measures for their
respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation
of the living resources of the high seas.
Technical Conference on the Conservation of Living Resources of the Sea, 14-55, 194-221
United Nations A/Conf. 10/7, New York (1956).
12. See Ricker, Stocks and Recruitment, 11 JOURNAL OF FisHING, RES. BOARD OF
CANADA, 559-623 (1954) (Ottawa).
13. International Law Comm'n, Report, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/3159
(1959); Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva,
February 24-April 27, 1958.
14. Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
Geneva, Feb. 24-Apr. 27, 1958.
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Article 2
As employed in this Convention, the expression "conservation
of the living resources of the high seas" means the aggregate
of the measures rendering possible the optimum sustainable
yield from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply
of food and other marine products. Conservation programmes
should be formulated with a view to securing in the first place
a supply of food for human consumption.
15
Thus within 40 years of the time when Baranov had published the
mathematical basis for relating fishing pressure to capability of a
fish population to produce fish, it had become a solemn obligation
in international law for nations to practice conservation in their
fisheries on resources of the high seas and to cooperate with other
nations in doing so.
The commanding position of this notion in international law
and practice grew out of cooperation among scientists and the
nations in the investigation of fisheries jointly participated in by
their nationals, and it demanded such cooperation in the further
application of these principals." In essence the entire theory of
fishery conservation rose or fell on the accuracy and completeness
of statistics, as well as knowledge of certain vital parameters of
the particular fish populations involved. Necessary for this
purpose were (a) a definition of the homogenous fish population
under study as to geography of occurrence, (b) the total yield of
the fishery on it by some unit of time, such as a year or fishing
season, (c) a measure of the amount of fishing effort used in the
capture, (d) the rate of recruitment to the fish population, (e) the
rate of growth of the species, and (f) the rate of mortality of the
fish population.
17
All of these parameters are subject to fluctuations arising
either from variations in the environment or in the activity of
man. To acquire sufficient precision to be useful in managing the
15. Id.
16. See Scientific Committee on Ocean Research, International Ocean Affairs (a
special report by a joint working group of ACMRR/SCOR/WMO [A.C.]), September
1, 1967, La Jolla, California, pp. 1-31.
17. See Schaefer, The Scientific Basis for a Conservation Programme, Papers,
International Technical Conference on the Conservation of Living Resources of the Sea,
1-55, United Nations A/Conf. 10/7 (New York) (1959).
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fishery for conservation purposes, several of the statistics needed
to be accumulated for a considerable number of years in
approximately the same manner over the period. The longer the
period of good statistics the more precise would be the estimates
of the parameters, and the more useful they would be in
interpreting the effect of the fishery on the population under
investigation and its ability to produce.
Although the obligation to conserve high seas fisheries is
generally agreeable to the nations (there was no dissent to this
principle from the 85 nations participating in the Conference on
the Law of the Sea in Geneva in 1958) there has not yet been
devised any generally agreeable formula as to how the benefits
(the fish) arising from such conservation practices should be
divided among the nations. Thus the activity of high seas fishing
remains one of the most fertile fields for generating disputes and
interaction among the nations."
Running through the thought and discussion on these
problems from the time of Petersen's (1894) early paper to date
have been two principles: (a) the fishery should be regulated so as
to secure the optimum sustainable catch (implying optimizing the
economic yield from the fishery); and, (b) the fishery should be
regulated so as to secure the maximum sustainable physical yield
from the resource in terms of weight of food. The theory on this
subject has been developed rather actively over the past 15 years
by Gordon (1953, 1954)," Turvey (1954), 20 Schaefer, (1959), l
18. See generally F. CHRISTY & A. ScoTr, THE COMMON WEALTH IN FISHERIES 1-
281 (1965).
19. Gordon, An Economic Approach to Optimum Utilization of Fishing Resources,
10 JOURNAL OF FISHING, RES. BOARD OF CANADA, 442-657 (1953); Gordon, The
Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 JOURNAL OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 124-42 (1954).
Net economic yield is the difference between total effort (capital and labor costs) put
into the fishing and the total price received for the catch.
Maximum physical yield (normally referred to in the literature as maximum
sustainable yield, or (MSY) is the weight of fish the population will produce, annually on
a sustainable basis when that is at its maximum level.
Optimum sustainable yield is a confused term attempting to combine the above two
terms (unsuccessfully because they are incompatible).
See Schaefer, Biological and Economic Aspects of the Management of Marine
Fisheries, 88 TRANS. AMERICAN FISHING SOCIETY 100-04 (1959).
20. Turvey, Optimization and Suboptimization in Fishery Regulation, 54 American
Economic Review no. 2, part 1 (1954).
21. Schaefer, supra note 19.
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Crutchfield and Zellner (1963).22 It has been summarized and
applied to international fisheries managerial structure recently by
Christy and Scott (1965).23
In essence, Gordon set out the thesis that economic yield
could not be maximized in a fishery on common property
resources without limiting entry to it. Schaefer demonstrated that
the point of maximum economic yield in a fishery is always at a
lower level of effort and catch than that corresponding to
maximum sustainable physical yield, and indicated some of the
decisions that are required to be made in picking which of these
criteria should be maximized. He demonstrated that the concepts
of maximizing net economic yield, and of maximizing sustainable
physical yield, from common property fishery resources are
mutually exclusive, and thus both cannot be accomplished.
Christy and Scott 4 advocate a generalization of the Gordon
thesis into practice which would be reached by:
(a) limiting entry into any fishery when this was required in
order to maximize the net economic yield from it;
(b) since limitation of entry could not be arranged unless
the resource (or access to it) was owned by some entity (or under
its exclusive jurisdiction), the living resources of the high seas each
should be put under the exclusive jurisdiction of a single managing
agency as such treatment is desired;
(c) because of the excessive mobility of many such
resources, and other practical problems, the single managing
agency should be the United Nations, and to it should be given
exclusive jurisdiction over each resource to be managed in this
manner;
(d) the revenue received by the United Nations from the
operation of the world fisheries in this manner would be divided
out or used in some manner agreed upon in the United Nations.
Whereas the approach to these problems agreed upon by the
nations in the Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas deals almost entirely with the
22. Crutchfield & Zeller, Economic Aspects of the Pacific Halibut Fishery, I FISHERY
INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH no. 1, (1963) (U.S. Govt. Printing Office).
23. F. CHRISTY & A. ScowT, supra note 18.
24. Id.
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production of wealth from these ocean resources, the approach of
Christy and Scott purports to deal simultaneously with the
production and distribution of this wealth. Chapman 5 has
discussed some of the problems involved in the application of the
Christy and Scott approach.
Adding to the complexity of this set of problems has been the
great emphasis since 1947 in the assistance to countries in the
developing world in the development of marine fisheries through
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO) and other international and bilateral agencies. Most
important of these aids to date are the Fishery Pre-Development
Survey Projects supported by the Special Fund of the United
Nations and executed by FAO Fisheries Department. As of
December 1, 1969, 8 such Projects have been completed, 32 others
are in operation, and a further 8 Projects are in an advanced stage
of approval. The amount of money involved in these 48 Projects
is about $120 million.
The greatest force in all of this, however, has simply been the
rapid development of fishing effort on a world-wide basis, which
has put strain on the productive capabilities of one after another
fish population of the high seas, and is still continuing to do so.
In 1850, the total world catch of fish and shellfish products was
(excluding whales) between 1.5 and 2.0 million metric tons; in
1900, about 4.0 million tons; in 1930 about 10.0 million tons; in
1950 about 20.0 million tons; in 1960, 38.0 million tons; in 1965,
52.4 million tons; and in 1968, 64 million metric tons.
26
The world catch was doubled in the last half of the 19th
century with the introduction of the steam engine and the
development of the trawl net. The period from 1900 to 1930
marked the increasing use of the internal combustion engine in
fishing vessels. The period 1930 to 1950 included the spreading use
of the diesel engine in fishing vessels and the increasing use of ice
in chilling at sea, as well as the beginning of freezing at sea. The
period 1950 to date has covered the broadened adaption of
25. Chapman, The Management of Ocean Fisheries, Proc. Fifth Meeting of the
Governor's Advisory Commission on Ocean Resources, Sacramento, California at 77-108
(1966); Chapman, The State of Ocean Use Management, COFI/67/lnf. 16, FAO, Rome,
at 1-11 (April 26, 1967).
26. Moiseev, The Present State and Development of World Fisheries, Sea Going
Fellowship Study Tour of Fishery Biology and Oceanography, USSR-FAO at 1-42 (1967).
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freezing at sea as well as other processing in the vessels; the wide
spread use of synthetic webbing in all sorts of net fishing which,
with the power block, has greatly improved the efficiency of purse
seining; the introduction of much new technology at sea, which
has greatly strengthened the economic ability of vessels to range
far from home ports and stay away for long periods; changes in
the business structure supporting fisheries; and the initiation of
such ocean commodities as frozen tuna, frozen shrimp, frozen fish
blocks and fish meal into being truly world products with global
markets.
The world has now entered into a period of excited
reexamination of the rules under which the nations will use the
ocean, and particularly the international common of the high seas.
Activity on this subject has been at a high level in the General
Assembly of the United Nations since 1966. The General
Assembly now seems to be moving in the direction of a new
General Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of the Sea.
While the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences foundered
on the relationships between the breadth of the territorial sea and
the jurisdiction by the coastal state over fisheries in the high seas
off its coast, this problem has had little to do with the current
excitement over the Law of the Sea in the General Assembly. As
a matter of fact the current proponents of change seem rather
embarrassed by the fact that the governance of the fisheries does
not fall within the framework of their anticipated changes very
comfortably, and that the developing nations may receive
economic and social harm from the changes in the Law of the Sea
being discussed, through damage to the growth of their fisheries.
The fuss in the General Assembly arose primarily over seabed
questions and the exaggerated oratory as to how much wealth
could be had from their harvest in the relatively near future for-
division among the developing nations. As inquiry has gone on,
and experts have been consulted, it becomes rather obvious that
the amount of wealth to be expected from the deep seabed for the
rest of this century is not much, and that from the continental
shelf is already clearly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
coastal state, or is likely to become so at another Law of the Sea
Conference.
One factor that the proponents of change seem to have
overlooked is that the value, at the primary producer level, of the
1970]
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food harvest from the sea is not only large (about $10 billion per
year), but more than twice as large as the value of all minerals
produced from the seabed (including petroleum and gas from the
continental shelf), growing at a steady rate of about 7 percent per
year, and in the hands of several million small entrepreneurs, the
big majority of whom are in the nations of the developing world.
The second factor that has been disregarded is that the
fisherman of the developing countries have been increasing the
yield of their fisheries more rapidly in the past decade than have
those of the developed countries, or the communist countries, and
that in 1968 the catches of the developing countries finally
exceeded in actual volume the catches of the developed countries."
The third factor that has been overlooked by the proponents
of change is that the alterations they seek in the Law of the Sea
are likely to be harmful to the expansion of the fisheries of the
developing countries, and beneficial to those of the developed
countries, which is contrary to their intent.28
The fourth neglected factor is that the present system of
governance of the sea fisheries has a history of 70 years of careful
research and practice of nations behind it, is the subject of
elaborate and complex activity by the nations through
intergovernmental fishery bodies and commissions, as well as
through many bilateral agreements, and that a fundamental role
in this is already played by the United Nations Development
Program, the Department of Fisheries of FAO, the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO, the
World Weather Watch of the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO), the lending facilities of International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International
Development Agency (IDA) and the Regional Banks, etc.
The present article attempts to take a cursory glimpse at the
working of this complex international machinery for the purpose
of seeing how well it is working and whether growth and
strengthening in it is needed, or whether it should be thrown away
27. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Year Book of Fishery
Statistics, Fishery Commodities for 1968, vol. 27 FAO, Rome (1969).
28. See Hearings on "The Ocean Regime of the Real World" Before the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1175 (1969); Chapman,
Some Problems and Prospects for the Harvest of Living Marine Resources to the Year
2000, April 1, 1970 (unpublished paper presented at a UNITAR Symposium).
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and a new start made with new machinery to be established within
the United Nations framework.
II. TYPES OF EXISTING INTERNATIONAL FISHERY COMMISSIONS
AND BODIES
New technology is now being adapted widely in the fisheries
of many countries so that high seas fishing is no longer the
concern of only a few nations. As fishing pressure increases and
as new nations become important in ocean fishing, problems
requiring international collaboration and cooperation increase.
29
In the past 70 years many forms of international commissions and
bodies have been developed to attend to such problems among the
nations. Some of these have been and are still effective; others
have not worked so well. The whole subject is presently under
study as respecting fisheries bodies as a wh6le, by the newly
established Committee on Fisheries;"° and as affecting all
international aspects of man's activities on the ocean by the
Secretary General of the United Nations.
31
There is a general feeling abroad that the present institutions
dealing with international aspects of marine use problems are not
adequate to deal with the problems that exist or are certain to
develop in the future. It is useful to look at the general sorts of
international fisheries commissions and bodies that presently
exist, and at their strengths and weaknesses. In the following
pages, existing institutions of this sort are discussed by general
types.
A. International Commission for the Exploration of the Sea
(ICES)
The oldest of these bodies is the International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea (ICES). It grew out of informal
cooperation among scientists in the countries adjacent to the
North Sea and interested in that body of water and its fisheries.
Following organizational meetings held in Stockholm in 1899 and
Christiana (Oslo) in 1901, an inaugural meeting was held in
29. See Jackson, Trends in World Fisheries, Fishing News Int'l, July, 1967, at 20.
30. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Fisheries
Report no. 33, FAO, Rome (1966) & Fisheries Report no. 40, FAO, Rome (1967)
[hereinafter referred to as Fisheries Report].
31. See U.N. REs. 2172. (XXI), December 6, 1966.
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Copenhagen in 1902. The work of this Council over the years may
be said to have laid the basis for the new sciences of hydrography
and fisheries. After surviving two world wars it is stronger now
than it ever has been. It has recently reorganized its affairs under
a formal convention negotiated among its members in 1964. To
it belong 16 countries of both Eastern and Western Europe.
Canada has recently joined. The United States, which belonged
but dropped out during World War I, is in the process of joining
again .32
Certainly ICES has been, and remains, a most successful
institution. Its original broad objective, "the international
investigation of the sea," has remained in practice. Although its
members are chiefly interested in the Northeast Atlantic and
adjacent seas, important studies from other parts of the world
ocean dealing with fisheries and hydrography, appear consistently
in its publications.
The Council employs a general secretary and a small
scientific and clerical staff which coordinate research and organize
meetings, but research within its purview is done by the agencies
and laboratories of member nations. Its operations are supported
by modest contributions of member governments. It conducts its
affairs through committees of national scientists on special topics
and on certain areas. It collects and collates fishery statistics and
hydrographic information, and publishes the results of
investigations.
The Council has not been directly involved with the
regulation of fisheries, but it has had an important role in shaping
various conventions designed to carry out its recommendations in
the Northeast Atlantic. These have included: (a) a convention for
the Baltic negotiated in 1929 among Danzig, Denmark, Germany,
Poland and Sweden, in respect of plaice and flounder fisheries,
which remained in effect until World War II; (b) a similar
convention signed in 1927 among Denmark, Norway and Sweden
for the plaice and dab fisheries of the Skagerrak, Kattegat, and
Sound; (c) the more broadly important Convention for the
Regulation of the Meshes of Fishing Nets and the Size Limits of
Fish, negotiated among 12 countries in 1946, but beoming
32. See International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, Pro Memoria
(Copenhagen, 1967, manuscript).
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effective in 1954; (d) the Convention Establishing the North-East
Atlantic Fisheries Commission, which came into effect in 1962,
replacing (c) above; and (e) North-East Atlantic Fisheries
Commission Joint Enforcement Program which was started
January 1, 1970.3
The Convention establishing the North-East Atlantic
Fisheries Commission differs from some others elsewhere in the
world in that it provides for another body, the ICES, rather than
the particular Commission it established, to provide the research
and research coordination upon which the regulatory Cdmmission
acts. A Liason Committee exists with ICES through which ICES
performs these functions for the Commission. This has worked to
the general satisfaction of members.
This bifurcate apparatus of one organization for research and
another for regulation has the difficulty in that, like others, it has
been so far generally ineffective in bringing about regulations
which require the cutting back or limitation of fishing effort. It
has devised no way of distributing the wealth of the sea that is
generally agreeable to its members. The consequence of rapidly
increasing fishing effort in the area has been, therefore, an
increase in the number of stocks of fish that are being fished at a
level of effort beyond that corresponding either to the maximum
net economic yield or the maximum physical yield. There is
general agreement, for instance, that if the effort on cod and
haddock fishing in the area were cut substantially the total catch
of cod would increase somewhat with corresponding decrease in
cost of catch.34 Since cod and haddock support most important
fisheries in the area, inability to deal with such problems gives
concern. The National members affected by this situation in cod,
haddock, and herring began serious negotiation of means to
rectify these problems in late 1969.
ICES' highly satisfactory activity over the years led to the
formation of two other councils modeled more or less on it. The
first was the International Council for the Scientific Exploration
of the Mediterranean Sea, which was organized in 1919. It
continues to function but with nowhere near the vigor and vitality
of ICES, dealing chiefly with problems in marine science such as
33. See FSHING NEws, January 9, 1970, at 17.
34. See, e.g. Meyer, The Development of Fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic, 4
Proceeding of the Seventh Int'l Congress of Nutritiion 1004 (1967).
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hydrography and plant biology, and not directly connected with
fisheries. The second such body was the North American Council
on Fishery Investigations formed in 1920 among Canada,
Newfoundland, the United States, and later, France. Its meetings
were discontinued in 1938 upon the outbreak of World War II
and were not resumed. However, this Council did have a bearing
on the subsequently established International Convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.
A third body, the West Pacific Fisheries Commission, was
formed on the ICES model in 1956 by agreement among the
Soviet Union, Mainland China, North Korea, and North Viet
Nam. In 1958 Mongolia adhered to this agreement. As with
ICES, the main emphasis is on coordinated investigations of the
various stocks of fish. There are no regulatory provisions, and the
annual sessions are of a general scientific nature, dealing with
specific problems through appropriate sub-committees as
conditions warrant.
3 5
Since this form of body is, in essence, a more or less informal
forum in which individual scientists can get together and
collaborate, its success is largely dependent upon an active
scientific community having common investigative interests in a
particular sea area. This condition does not yet exist in many
ocean regions.
B. The Fur Seal Convention
The first international convention designed to attend to the
conservation of a marine animal was signed in 1911 among Great
Britain (for Canada), the United States, Japan and Russia to
protect the population of fur seals in the North Pacific, which had
been strongly reduced in number by pelagic sealing. It remains an
unique example of this particular type of convention.
All members Agreed to prohibit pelagic sealing. The United
States, in return, undertook to manage the Pribilof Islands seal
herds (the largest) and pay Canada and Japan each 15 percent of
the annual harvest. Russia undertook to manage the Commander
Island herd and also pay Canada and Japan each 15 percent of
35. See Mathison and Bevan, Some Int'l Aspects of Soviet Fisheries, Conference on




its annual harvest. Japan undertook to manage the Robben Island
herd (which had been reduced to only a few animals) and pay
Canada and Russia each 10 percent of its annual harvest. There
was no provision for a continuing Commission or for joint or
coordinated research. In actuality little research was done even by
the countries directly responsible for the management of the
herds.
3
The reaction of the fur seal herds to this protection was
prompt and rapid. By 1916 the Probilov herd had nearly doubled
in size and by 1930 it had increased to about 1.5 million
individuals. The convention was successful until, in October, 1940,
Japan notified the other members of its intention to abrogate a
year hence, which it did. It did this on the stated grounds that the
fur seal herds had increased so much that the objectives of the
convention had been fulfilled, and that fur seals were now so
numerous that they were affecting adversely the yield of Japanese
fisheries. Political tensions in the Pacific area at that time may
have had an influence on this action as well.
37
During World War II in the Pacific, protection of fur seals
in the eastern and northern Pacific was continued under
agreement between Canada and the United States. The U.S.S.R.
has not engaged in pelagic sealing. Japan, by agreement following
the treaty of peace, refrained from pelagic sealing. Finally in 1957,
after extensive investigations had been made that assessed the
number of fur seals in the North Pacific more precisely than had
been the case before, and also assessed their relationship to the
stocks of fish used commercially in the area, the four parties to
the original convention concluded a new convention. The new
convention continued the main features of the original one
changed in no considerable way, and provided additionally for a
continuing Commission which would make such
recommendations from time to time to the governments as
research done under its purview by the member governments
indicated to be desirable. This Interim Convention of
Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals was extended for another
36. See Scheffer & Todd, History of the Scientific Study of the Alaskan Fur Seal,
1786-1964, Washington Bureau of Commercial Fisheries (1967).
37. See Herrington & Kash, International Conservation Problems, and Solutions in
Existing Conventions. Papers, Int'l Technical Conference.on Conservation of Living
Resources of the Sea, U.S. A/Conf 10/7 (1955).
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six years in 1963, with only minor -modifications,38 and is still in
effect, with the Commission still meeting annually, in 1970.
Thus for 59 years the fur seal herds of the North Pacific
have, first, been restored as nearly as practical to that level of
abundance which will provide the maximum sustainable annual
crop of furs, and, second, kept at that stage, to the continuing
satisfaction of the member governments. There is no other marine
conservation convention with such a record of success for so long
a period.
39
It should be noted that there are no private entrepreneurs
involved in the fur seal business. Robben Island went to Russia
at the end of the Pacific War and thus the two rookeries (Robben
and Commander) in the western Pacific, together with some small
herds in the Kuriles are under Russian control and operated as a
State enterprise. After a brief and unsatisfactory period of leasing
the Pribilov herds to private enterprise"0 the Department of the
Interior of the United States took over the management of that
herd and has continued in that role to this day. The cessation of
pelagic sealing brought an end to private Japanese and Canadian
enterprise in this fishery and the respective governments receive
the allotments of skins, or money, owing to them annually under
the treaty. This continues to be a satisfactory agreement to them.
There has not, as yet, been any other international
conservation agreement which has provided for a distribution of
the wealth generated by the conservation measures undertaken as
tlis one has done. Although there is no barrier under international
law preventing another nation from engaging in pelagic sealing,
none have done so and it may be that this, in itself, is in the
process of forming, by the practice of nations, new international
law. On the other hand the absence of new entrants into the
fishery may result from the entire fur seal business being of
modest economic interest, and the cost of entering the business by
nations outside the North Pacific being relatively high.
In 1957 an agreement to regulate sealing for harp seal, hood
38. Message by the President of the United States, to the United States Senate,
Protocol amending the Interim Convention of Conservation of the North Pacific Fur Seal,
November 29, 1963.
39. See Scheffer & Todd, supra note 36.
40. See Tomaseuich, Int'l Agreements on Conservation of Marine Resources, Food
Research Institute, Stanford University, California (1943).
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seal, and walrus in the waters from Greenland to Novaja Semlja
was concluded between Norway and the Soviet Union. The
objective is to obtain the optimum yield from the resources and
to coordinate scientific investigations on seals in the convention
waters. No catch quotas have yet been established, although there
have been agreements on hunting seasons and some fleet
restrictions, while the laborious research needed to provide a
scientific basis for future decisions goes on.4
A protocol to the International Convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries to provide protection for the seals of
that region is in effect.
C. International Pacific Halibut Commission and Similar
Conventions
A different approach to these problems was taken by Canada
and the United States when, in 1923, they negotiated a treaty to
investigate the halibut fishery in which the nationals of the two
engaged jointly in the Northeast Pacific. After viewing the results
of the initial research, in 1930, the two governments renegotiated
the treaty and gave the Commission established under it authority
to regulate the fishery. By 1953 the results of the regulations by
the Commission were judged to be so beneficial that the treaty
was once again renegotiated, somewhat broadening and clarifying
its powers to regulate.
This convention developed these novel features: (a) the
Commission was provided with a budget of its own, supported in
equal parts by the two governments, adequate to hire its own
scientific staff and do its own research, which it has continued to
do to this day; (b) it had authority designed to permit it to
accomplish the objectives assigned to it by the convention which
established it; (c) the objective of the convention was clearly stated
to be to guard the welfare of the fishery by protecting the halibut
stocks of the North-East Pacific to such level that they would
produce the maximum sustainable yield; and (d) although the
treaty was silent on the subject, the Commission, at an early stage
in its work, formed an advisory committee drawn from the
industries of the two countries to assist it in its work. The halibut
stocks were gradually brought to a level corresponding to that
41. See Mathison & Bevan, supra note 35.
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which would support the maximum sustainable yield. These yields
have been kept approximately at that level for the past 18 years
by limitation of total fishing effort.
There was no attempt made to divide the catch as between
the two nations. There was freedom for all hands, irrespective of
nationality, to fish until the annual quota was taken. The effect
over the years has been for the Canadian catch to increase and
the American catch to stay reasonably level. This has not caused
contention. As a matter of fact, in 1950 a particular separate
convention was negotiated by the two countries, with the approval
of their respective industries, under which each extended port
privileges to the halibut vessels of the other during the halibut
season.42
A main complaint that has been brought against the
operation of this Commission 43 is that its activity, by maximizing
the physical yield of halibut, and failing to limit entry into the
fishery, destroyed the net economic yield that might have been
derived from the fishery had the standard of maximizing the net
economic yield been adopted.
This effect of its regulations was recognized by the
Commission and its scientific staff at the beginning of regulation
in the early 1930's, but the advisory committee and the
governments, when it was explained to them that shorter and
shorter seasons would result from annual quota regulation and
free entry to the fishery, voluntarily chose the path of maximizing
the physical yield from the resource. The fishermen, vessel owners
and processor-distributors have remained content with this over
the years, somewhat to the despair of the economists. The vessels
and fishermen have gone off into other fisheries and occupations
at the end of the short halibut season, and have continued to
prosper relative to some of the other fisheries of the region. The
42. See UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 89th Cong., Ist Sess.,
TREATIES AND INT'L AGREEMENTS CONTAINING PROVISIONS ON COMMERCIAL FISHERIES,
'MARINE RESOURCES, SPORT FISHERIES, AND WILD LIFE TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS
A PARTY, Committee print, January, 1965.
43. See Burkenroad, Some Principles of Marine Fishery Biology, INSTITUTE OF
MARINE SCIENCE PUBLICATIONS, vol. 2, no. 1, at 1, University of Texas, Austin (1951);
Gordon, An Economic Approach to Optimum Utilization of Fishing Resources, 10
JOURNAL OF FISHING, RES. BOARD OF CANADA 124 (1953); Crutchfield & Zeliner,
Economic Aspects of the Pacific Halibut Fishery, FISHERY INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH Vol. 1,
no. 1, U.S. Govt. Printing Office (1963); F. CHRISTY & A. SCOTT, supra note 18.
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industry remains prosperous; the governments are happy over the
results. Only the theoretical economists are disgruntled.
Following directly from the excellent preliminary results of
the Halibut Convention, Canada and the United States, in 1930,
negotiated a convention to similarly protect the sockeye salmon
fisheries dependent upon runs originating in the Fraser River. This
convention came into effect in 1937. The Commission formed
under it was given the power to regulate the fishery after it had
completed eight yearg of investigations. It also had its own
scientific staff financed by contributions in equal amounts by the
two governments. It had an industrial advisory committee, but in
this case it was provided for in the protocol of exchange to the
convention, on the basis of the successful results there had been
with an industry advisory committee for the Halibut Commission.
This Commission had one novel feature. The catch was to be
divided equally each year between the fishermen of the two
countries. On the face of it this would seem to be a practical
impossibility. The Commission, however, has improved its
knowledge of the characteristics of the several salmon runs and
fisheries under its jurisdiction each year to such an extent that it
has been able to do this to the practical satisfaction of the two
industries and governments.
The success of this Commission's work has been so great that
in 1956 the treaty was renegotiated to give the Commission
similar managerial authority over the pink salmon fisheries
dependent upon Fraser River runs." Again, the chief complaint
brought against this Commission has been that, by failing to limit
entry to the fishery, and concentrating on maximizing the
sustainable physical yield, the net economic yield, or rent, has
been dissipated. Since the Commission only regulates the total
catch to be taken, it is perfectly within the purview of the
respective country to limit entry into its own fishery on its half
of the catch. The Canadian government is, in fact, beginning to
apply this politically delicate concept in its half of the fishery.
Following directly on the success of these two northwest
44. See UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
TREATIES AND INT'L AGREEMENTS CONTAINING PROVISIONS ON COMMERCIAL FISHERIES,
MARINE RESOURCES, SPORT FISHERIES, AND WILD LIFE TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS
A PARTY, Committee print, January, 1965.
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conservative commissions, the United States and Costa Rica
negotiated a convention in 1949 establishing the Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), to investigate the effect of
the fishery on the tuna and bait stocks of common concern in the
eastern tropical and sub-tropical Pacific, and to make regulatory
recommendations to the governments based on its findings."
This Convention also provided for an International
Commission, permitting it-to hire a staff of its own to do its
research work, with the joint expenses to be paid by the two
governments. This payment was not to be in equal parts, but on
the basis of relative use of the resource by their respective
nationals. The objective of the convention was clearly stated to be
creating conditions to make possible the maximizing of the total
sustainable physical yield from the resources.
This Convention, unlike those in the North-East Pacific, was
open ended so that any other nation involved in these fisheries,
and interested in joining the work of the Commission, could
adhere to the Convention upon request and the consent of the
others. In this manner, Panama, Ecuador, Mexico, Canada and
Japan have become members. This Commission did not have
regulatory authority in itself, but did have the responsibility of
making conservation recommendations to the member countries.
The scientific work done by the staff of this Commission has
been extraordinarily competent and fruitful. Aside from its own
research it has been able, through cooperation with other scientific
institutions of its member countries, and some of those not
members but interested (such as Columbia, Peru, Chili, and Japan
before it joined) to greatly expand knowledge of the ocean regime
of the eastern tropical and sub-tropical Pacific, particularly as this
applied to the life histories of the tunas.
Early in its work (by 1955) the Commission was able to
establish that none of the stocks within its purview were being
over fished, although that for yellowfin had been close to this
point in 1950. Throughout the decade of the 1950's economic
conditions prevented the increase of tuna fishing effort in the
Eastern Pacific. Accordingly the LATTC did not recommend
regulations to its members until 1960.
The members are in an awkward position because the fishery
45. Id.
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operates on two species of tuna, yellowfin and skipjack, to an
extent that the economics of the industries are dependent on the
yield from both species. It is difficult to catch one species to the
exclusion of the other. Yet the scientific evidence indicates that the
skipjack stock will stand a considerably greater yield than
presently taken from it, whereas the effort the fishery employs at
the present corresponds with the maximum sustainable yield for
yellowfin, or slightly exceeds it. Accordingly, the nations began
limiting the effort on yellowfin fishing in 1966 and have refined
and extended this in 1967 and subsequent years. It cannot be said
that the regulatory regime yet is very satisfactory, but it can be
said that there is no over-fishing on skipjack and such over-fishing
as exists on yellowfin is of modest extent, if it exists at all.
This Commission is now running into trouble from at least
two sources: (a) there has not yet been worked out a system
satisfactory to the member nations for distributing the catch as
among nations when regulation became necessary; and (b)
insufficient funds have been made available to the Commission for
establishing some of the parameters it requires for making more
precise its estimate of fish stock size and the effect of the
fishery upon it. One of the principal countries has not paid its
contribution for the last few years and has served notice of
withdrawal from the Convention. There is no provision in the
Convention for limitation of entry into the fishery. The industry
is propsperous; demand for product is strong on the world
market; the fleet is expanding rapidly in size and efficiency; there
are fears of over capitalization.
D. The International Whaling Commission
Between the initiation of substantial commercial whaling in
the l1th century and its expansion into Antarctica in the 20th
century, there was adequate evidence that the whale stocks were
very susceptible to over-fishing. In 1924 and 1927 the League of
Nations made strong but fruitless efforts to bring about
international agreements to restrict whaling. In 1929, Norway,
then the major whaling nation, passed some unilateral regulations.
In 1936, a Convention on this subject was negotiated in Geneva.
It was generally accepted by the whaling countries and was
improved upon by the conference in London in 1937, 1938 and
1939.
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The effect of these activities was inconsequential. The
regulations adopted were stop gap measures; they protected
unimportant species, closed inconsequential areas, established
minimum sizes, prohibited killing females with nursing calves, but
never came to the core of the problem-the limitation of kill on
a particular stock to the level corresponding with maximum
sustainable yield.
In 1946 a confexence of all whaling countries in Washington,
D.C. resulted in the establishment of an International
Commission on Whaling having regulatory powers. This came
into effect in 1948.46
For the first time in international whaling history an overall
catch quota was set at 16,000 blue whale units, and therein lay
the core of the trouble. The thrust of the convention was to protect
the investment nations had in whaling, not to limit the catch from
any stock of whales to that level corresponding with the maximum
sustainable yield. Catch quotas were, and are, calculated in blue
whale equivalents. While this made sense industrially, it made no
sense whatever from a conservation standpoint. The quotas were
not calculated from mortality, recruitment and growth rates of
particular species or stocks. These were not known and the
expensive research to find them out was not funded.
The quota that was established, as incompatible as it was
with natural history, was too high in toto; but it remained in effect
except for minor reductions until the 1960-61 season. In this short
period of years, the blue whale had ceased being an important
contributor to the catch, the formerly ignored fin whale bore the
brunt of the killing, and even the small sei whale became
important in the catch. Efforts to allocate fixed percentages of the
quota of each whaling nation and stop expansion of effort were
to no avail. Nations, instead, built new whaling fleets and bought
old ones that had become bankrupt.
Public outcry over the decimation of the world's whale stocks
resulted in the establishment of a committee of neutral expert
population dynamicists to examine all relevant data and make
recommendations to the Commission. Two reports by these




committees4 7 finally broke the deadlock on reducing catch quotas
in the Antarctic whaling. The quota of 15,000 blue whale units
adopted for the 1962-63 season was reduced to 3,500 units for the
1966-67 season, which was still higher than the limit
recommended by the scientists. Finally under the heavy pressure
of .world public opinion, the quota was reduced below the level
corresponding to the maximum sustainable level for the 1968-69
season. Finally, the time consuming task of rebuilding the whale
stocks of Antarctica has begun.
The International Whaling Commission still has not adopted
the sensible system of setting quotas by species or stock, nor has
it provided for uniformly international inspection for carrying out
of its regulations. No considerable scientific work has been
initiated likely to yield information needed for the formulation of
better regulations. During this past eight years of restriction in the
Antarctic the two largest remaining whaling countries (Soviet
Union and Japan) have, respectively, built new whaling fleets and
bought old ones from the other nations, and sought to' recoup
their investments by intensifying whaling in the North Pacific.
Only in 1969 was voluntary regulation of the yield of sperm
whales in the North Pacific adopted by the nations involved.
The International Commission on Whaling (IWC) has
become the apex of ineffectiveness in international cooperation
aimed at conservation, or the rational management, of high seas
fisheries. Its failure provided the arguments for those who would
divide up the ocean into national sectors. It must be noted,
however, that Chile's 200 mile territorial sea -claim was supported
in great part by its desire to avoid the regulations established by
the International Commission on Whaling. Since IWC
regulations applied only to the high seas, and all of Chile's
whaling occurred within 200 miles of Chile, an extension of the
breadth of its territorial sea to 200 miles solved that problem. It
must also be noted that Peru, after enforcing its 200 mile limit
against other whaling countries, killed migratory sperm whales
47. See Chapman, Final Report of the Committee of Three Scientists on the Special
Scientific Investigations of the Antarctic Whale Stocks, 15th Report of the International
Commission on Whaling at 40 (1964); Report of the Committee of Four Scientists on the
Special Scientific Investigations of the Antarctic Whale Stocks, 16th Report of the
International Commission on Whaling at 47 (1965).
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passing through its "territorial sea" with sufficient effort to
overfish them by its own activity.48
E. The Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council (IPFC) and FA 0
At its third session, held in 1947, the FAO Conference
recommended that FAO should take the initiative in forming
regional councils for the scientific exploration of the sea in parts
of the world not then served by similar bodies, giving primary
attention to: Northwestern Atlantic, Southwestern Pacific and
Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea and contiguous waters,
Northeastern Pacific, Southeastern Pacific, Western South
Atlantic, and Eastern South Atlantic and Indian Ocean.49
The first outgrowth of this extensive scheme was the
formation of the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Commission (IPFC) in
1948. By 1965 there were 17 members-France, Philippines,
United States, Thailand, India, Netherlands, Burma. Ceylon,
United Kingdom, Australia, Pakistan, Korea, Indonesia, Viet
Nam, Cambodia, Japan and Malaysia. China had been a
member, but ceased to be in 1952. Indonesia withdrew in 1965.
IPFC is originally a part of FAO, but semi-independent,
having been organized under the provision of Article XIV of the
FAO Constitution. It follows the general pattern of ICES in that
it has no regulatory powers over fisheries in the area but
coordinates and reports on fishery, oceanographic and related
research carried on by member governments in the area. It
conducts its affairs through continuing committees. It holds
conferences on special subjects and plans joint programs of
activity among its members.
Unlike ICES it deals with fresh water as well as marine
problems, and is much concerned with fishery technology and
economics as well as other aspects of fishery development. Its
secretariat is supplied by FAO, which also gives limited support
for travel by Council officers attending committee meetings held
between annual meetings, and for publications of transactions.
48. See Saetersdal, Mejia, & Ramirez, La Caza de Cachalotes in el Peru, (text in
Spanish) Inst. Inv. de los Recurros Marinos, Boletino no. 3, Julio, 1963.
49. See Carroz, Establishment. Functions, and Activities of International Fisheries
Bodies, Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council, FAO Fisheries Technical Papers no. 57, Rome
(1965).
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To an outsider looking into the IPFC region, and *into IPFC
operations, the appearance is given that this is an effective
organization, considering the stage of development of'the fisheries
and aquatic sciences in many of the member countries, the
political strife in the region, the great size of the area and the
complexities of the problems with which IPFC attempts to deal.
For the first four years of its life the Council met once a year.
Since 1952 it has met every other year. Attendance at meetings is
good; the Council has, without doubt, done much to stimulate the
growth of fishery science, as well as fisheries, in the region.
Nevertheless, there has been growing unrest in I PFC as to its
work in recent years. The problems do not arise much from over-
fishing or competitive problems among the member countries as
is the case in the northern hemisphere. Rather, they are more
concerned with a feeling of ineffectiveness. Resolutions are passed
and nothing happens. Neither the member countries nor FAO
have been very liberal in supplying funds or other support to
permit the recommended resolutions to become effective. Adding
to this dissatisfaction has been the left out feeling of the new
countries of East Africa, and the Arab countries west of Pakistan.
Although eligible for membership in IPFC none of them belong
or seem to intend joining.
These problems were discussed in some detail at the second,
third and fourth sessions of FAO's Advisory Committee on
Marine Resources" and by the FAO Committee on Fisheries at
its first and second sessions.51 The upshot of the matter has been
that FAO's Commission on Fisheries (COFI) recommended the
creation of a new fishery body to attend to Indian Ocean fishery
problems while retaining I PFC in its present role. Accordingly,
the Indian Ocean Fishery Commission was established in 1967 by
the Council of FAO under Article VI-1 of the FAO Constitution,
with the following objectives: (1) promote, assist and coordinate
national programs over the entire field of fishery development and
cooperation; (2) promote research and development activities in
the area through international sources, and in particular
international aid programs; and (3) examine management
50. See Fisheries Report no. 20 (1964); Fisheries Report no. 23 (1965); Fisheries
Report no. 41 (1967) FAO, Rome.
51. See Fisheries Report no. 33, FAO, Rome (1966) & Fisheries Report no. 40, FAO,
Rome (1967).
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problems with particular reference, because of the need to take
urgent action, to those relating to the management of offshore
resources. The Commission held its first meeting in September,
1968,52 has acquired staff, and is engaging in its duties, primarily
through the funding assistance of the United Nations
Development Program.
A second council growing out of the action of the 1947 FAO
Conference on this subject was the General Fisheries Council for
the Mediterranean (GFCM). This was organized at a meeting
called by FAO in Rome in 1949, and held its inaugural meeting
in 1952.5 It, .also, is organized within the terms of Article XIV
of the FAO Constitution and the pattern of its work, support, and
relationships with FAO and the member countries is much the
same as that of IPFC. The Council has headquarters in Rome.
The secretariat and limited publication support is supplied by
FAO. The secretary of the Council organizes- the annual meetings
and serves as editor of the proceedings. While not the most
vigorous and dynamic fishery body in the world, GFCM appears
to be reasonably satisfactory to the member nations. It has little
or nothing to do with the managerial problems of Mediterranean
fisheries.
A third council, a Latin American Fisheries Council, was
stimulated to growth at about this time, but it never received the
necessary ratifications required to come into being. With this
failure, the idea of organizing a system of regional fishery councils
under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution as envisioned by the
1947 FAO Conference came to an end.
A difficulty with Regional Fisheries Councils organized
under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution was that each was
established under a convention which required ratification by
member countries. With the failure of the Latin American
Fisheries Council convention to obtain adequate ratifications, this
mechanism was recorgnized by FAO to be too cumbersome. The
10th session of the FAO Conference 4 authorized the
abandonment of further activity respecting the Latin American
Fisheries Council and instead authorized the stimulation of
52. See Fisheries Report no. 60, FAO, Rome (1968).
53. See General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean, Proceedings and Technical
Papers no. I (Rome 1952).
54. Report of the 10th Sess. of the Conference, FAO, Rome (1959).
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Regional Fisheries Commissions under Article VI of the FAO
Constitution. The organization of such Commissions under
Article VI did not require ratification by adhering members. It is
through this mechanism that the Indian Ocean Fisheries
Commission, noted above, was organized.
In 1961, efforts were undertaken to organize a Regional
Fisheries Commission for West Africa. An organizational
meeting was held at Dakar and a first session was held in Tunis.
The political situation then existing in West Africa proved to be
unsuited to successful action at that time.
Better success attended the establishment of the Regional
Fisheries Advisory Commission for the Southwest Atlantic,
organized among Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. This
Commission has held three sessions (Rio de Janeiro, 1962; Mar
del Plata, 1964; and Montevideo, 1966). It has led to cooperative
programs of research among the three countries and an increased
liaison between the fishery scientists working in the region.
55
A fault in this sort of Commission has come to light in this
Southwest Atlantic Commission (CARPAS). Article VI of the
FAO Constitution 6 provides that membership in regional
commissions organized under it are open only to member nations
and associate members of FAO, whose territories are situated
wholly or in part in the region. This did not work adequately with
CARPAS. Although Paraguay wanted to join, and other
countries wanted her to be a member, her territory was not
situated on the Southwest Atlantic. Again, Spain, Russia, Cuba
and some other countries were fishing in the area but did not have
territory in the region and thus could not become members of
CARPAS.
Since this proves to be a general impediment to the
organization and practical operation of such regional fisheries
commissions within FAO, COFI at its second session
57
recommended a change in this provision of Article VI of the FAO
Constitution so that regional fisheries commissions could be
established in reference to sea areas, rather than land areas, with
55. See Fisheries Report no. 25, FAO, Rome (1965); Fisheries Report no. 61, FAO,
Rome, (1968).
56. See Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Basic Texts, vol.
1, FAO, Rome, (1969).
57. See Fisheries Report no. 46, FAO, Rome, (1967).
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provision for any member nation working in that sea area being
eligible for membership in that Commission. This produced a
serious squabble internally within the membership of FAO, and
the effort was finally abandoned.
F. International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries
A sixth general sort of international fisheries body was
initiated in 1949 with the negotiation of the Convention
establishing the International Commission for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF). To a considerable extent the ICNAF
Convention melded together practice in this field in Europe arising
from ICES experience and that arising from experience with the
Halibut and Salmon Commissions in the Pacific. As with New
World practice, the objective of ICNAF was to maximize the
physical yield from the resources within its purview. It was
equipped with advisory committees on which, in practice, industry
was represented. There were provisions through which
recommendations could become regulations affecting the
fishermen of all member nations.
Although there was provision for ICNAF to hire its own
staff it has had only a small secretariat and has depended upon
national scientists working through committees to do and
correlate its its research. ICNAF combines, in many ways, the
concepts of both ICES and NEAFC in the Northeast Atlantic,
in that it combines research and management functions in one
organization. A new development in ICNAF was the division of
its rather large and diversified region into five panel areas so that
the special problems of the sub-region could be dealt with
preliminarily by those member nations particularly involved with
that sub-area.
From the standpoint of research accomplishments ICNAF
appears to have worked very well. A greatly enhanced cooperative
investigative program of the whole Northwest Atlantic Ocean and
its resources has been carried out. Symposia on particular
questions held either alone or jointly with ICES and FAO have
been a particularly fruitful ICNAF activity5
58. See International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries; Some
Problems for Biological Fishery Survey and Techniques for their Solution, 1958;
Proceedings on the Joint Scientific Meeting of ICNAF, ICES & FAO on Fishing Effort,
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The management of the resources within its purview does not
seem to go much better than under the ICES-NEAFC system in
the Northeast Atlantic. It is not obvious from the outside whether
this is related to the system of operation or to the similarity of
the problems and nations involved.
In ICES, the research problems are dealt with by
administrators in a wholly different organization, NEAFC. The
relationship between the two is conducted through a Formal
Liaison Committee of ICES which NEAFC provides for and
partially funds. 9 The apparatus, while cumbersome, has dealt
reasonably well with small-scale managerial problems, such as the
regulation of mesh size of trawls. It has not yet been able to deal
satisfactorily with managerial problems requiring the cessation of
growth in total fishing effort on a fish stock, or its cutting back.
It has begun to do so, however. The Northeast Atlantic Fisheries
Commission's Joint Enforcement Program was started in 1970.0
Conferences among the affected nations respecting limitation of
effort in the herring and cod fisheries were intiated in late 1969.
In ICNAF the key delegates are administrators. The.advisors
to delegations, in practice, include industry representatives as well
as scientists. Accordingly, the scientists have not been able to act
together in quite the same atmosphere as in ICES, but the impact
of their views on administrators has possibly been somewhat more
direct and rapidly acting than in NEAFC. To an outside observer
the practical results of the ICNAF system appears to be about the
same, so far, as in the ICES-NEAFC system.
Despite the complaints of the scientists in the ICNAF system
of interference from administrators and industry representatives in
their deliberations, the scientific results appear to be about as
good as in the ICES-NEAFC system when account is taken of
the relative youth of the ICNAF organization. ICNAF also has
been able to handle some managerial problems involving
regulation of trawl mesh size in a reasonably satisfactory manner,
although very slowly and imperfectly. As in the ICES-NEAFC
system, however, the ICNAF system has not yet been able to
the Effect of Fishing on Resources, and the Selectivity of Fishing Gear (1960);
ICES/ICNAF Red Fish Symposium (1961); North Atlantic Fish Marking Symposium
(1963); Environmental Surveys. Northwestlant vols. 1-3 (1968).
59. See International Council for Exploration of the Sea, supra note 32.
60. See FiSHING NEws, supra note 33.
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handle satisfactorily managerial problems requiring limitation of
total fishing effort on a particular stock of fish. The rapid growth
of total fishing effort in the ICNAF area is now demanding such
limitation, as in the Northeast Atlantic, in order to prevent
glaring over-fishing. It has begun in 1970, in respect to the
haddock fisheries on Georges Bank. It appears likely to begin
shortly in respect of high seas salmon fishing.
Since the countries involved in both systems are the most
advanced fishing countries in the world, with the longest history
in fishery science and management, these problems are receiving
continuing attention. Both systems are in the process of
modification, or discussion aimed at improvement. Essentially the
problem is that while the scientists are able to agree on the level
of effort in the major fisheries that corresponds with the
maximum sustainable yield, the administrators are unable to
agree on the way in which fishing effort should be limited in order
to maximize either total physical yield, or net economic yield.
In 1960 at a Symposium on African Tunas held in Dakar,
Senegal, under the auspices of the Commission for Science and
Technology of the States South of the Sahara (CCTA), a group
of representatives from West African nations called for the
establishment of an international tuna commission for the east
central Atlantic modeled on what they felt to be the successful
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. This led to CCTA
making a request to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
in 1961 to initiate such activity, which action the Secretary
General referred to FAO. 61
This posed an exceedingly complex problem to FAO. So far
as scientific information was available it .was understood that the
stocks of tuna fished off West Africa were likely to be migratory
across the whole Atlantic, so that research as well as regulation
would have to apply clear across the Atlantic in order to be
effective.62 The fishery was as broadly migratory as the fish and
was participated in extensively by vessels from Asiatic countries
as well as from countries in North America, South America,
Europe and Africa. The bulk of the fishery lay south of the area
of principal interest to ICES and of statutory interest to ICNAF.
61. See Fisheries Report no. 13, FAO, Rome (1968).




Neither the Regional Fisheries Commission for West Africa, nor
CARPAS, was in a position to bring its effort to bear on this
wide ranging sort of fish, or the fisheries upon it.
FAO appointed a Working Party for Rational Utilization of
Tuna Resources in the Atlantic Ocean which met in two sessions
to deal with this nexus of problems.6 This resulted in a conference
of plenipotentiaries being convened under FAO auspices in Rio de
Janeiro in 19664 which negotiated a convention to establish the
International Commission for Atlantic Tunas. The convention
came into force, and the first meeting of the new ICAT was held
in Rome late in 1969. Staff is now being acquired.
When fully operational, the apparatus which this convention
will provide will be an outgrowth of the ICNAF model, but with
inputs from other models as well. Its function will be to provide
for the conservation of all tuna populations in the Atlantic Ocean.
It will be able to organize its work in panels, which may have
either geographic or a species base. It will be open ended, so that
any member of the United Nations family can become a member.
It will have a formal relationship with FAO, but will be
autonomous from it. It will have the ability to maintain its own
scientific staff (as in LATTC) but the financial clauses indicate
that it is more likely to depend upon the research efforts of
national scientists, as in ICES and ICNAF.
During the 1960's, fishing pressure, particularly trawling for
hake, grew so heavy in the Southeast Atlantic (south of the
Congo) that cooperative study and probable regulation to prevent
overfishing was called for. Pursuant to recommendations from
FAO's COFI a conference of plenipotentiaries was called in 1969
which resulted in the negotiation of a convention among the
affected countries to establish an International Commission for
the Southeast Atlantic Fisheries. This is acquiring ratification and
will probably come into effect in 1970. This apparatus is still too
new to evaluate.
G. Restrictive Fishery Conventions
In the 1950's three different international conventions came
into force designed to limit the fishing of particular nations in
63. See Fisheries Report no. 13, Rome (1963); Fisheries Report no. 27, Rome (1963).
64. See Fisheries Report no. 13, Rome (1963).
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particular high seas areas. All of them have a different basis for
doing this. They are: (1) the Convention establishing the South
Pacific Commission, among Chile, Ecuador and Peru;65 (2) the
Convention establishing the International Commission for High
Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean,"6 among Japan, the
United States, and Canada; and (3) the Soviet-Japanese Fisheries
Convention.6 7
The first of these was organized in August 1952 when the
Permanent Co-mmission for the Exploitation and Conservation of
the Maritime Resources of the South Pacific was established. This
Commission is an expression of the claims by Chile, Ecuador and
Peru to sovereignty over the sea and its resources to a minimum
distance of 200 marine miles from their respective coasts. The
stated objectives of the Commission are to secure a better
exploitation and conservation of the maritime resources of the
South Pacific. Three sub-commissions were created to deal with
treaties, diplomatic matters and technical subjects. The inaugural
meeting took place in December 1954. There have been meetings
from time to time since. Although the Commission has very broad
terms of reference, it has so far dealt mainly with efforts to
control whaling. The apparatus is apparently not fully satisfactory
to the members. 8
The second of these conventions was negotiated in 1952
among Japan, United States and Canada. It came into force in
1953,9 and held its inaugural meeting in 1954. It has continued
to'meet annually, or more frequently, since.
It also has very broad terms of reference, but it's key feature
is the so-called "principle" of abstention, under which contracting
parties that have not historically fished on stocks of fish that are
being fully utilized by one or more of the other contracting parties
65. See MaeChesney, International Law Situations and Documents, NAUPERS
15031, vol. 51 (1957).
66. See UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 89th Cong., ist Sess.,
TREATIES AND INT'L AGREEMENTS CONTAINING PROVISIONS ON COMMERCIAL FISHERIES,
MARINE RESOURCES, SPORT FISHERIES, AND WILD LIFE TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS
A PARTY, Committee print, January, 1965.
67. See Mathison & Bevan, supra note 35.
68. See Fisheries Report no. 46, FAO, Rome (1967).
69. See UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
TREATIES AND INT'L AGREEMENTS CONTAINING PROVISIONS ON COMMERCIAL FISHERIES,
MARINE RESOURCES, SPORT FISHERIES, AND WILD LIFE TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS
A PARTY, Committee print, January, 1965.
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will abstain from entering the fishery on those fully utilized
stocks. The practical thrust of this convention was to keep
Japanese fishermen out of the high seas fishery for salmon
originating from North American streams and from the halibut
fishery of the Northeast Pacific.
One result of this convention was a very much enhanced
research program in the entire North Pacific centering around
salmon which discovered that salmon from Asian streams move
far over toward the American mainland during feeding migration,
whereas salmon from American streams move far west of the
"abstention" line of the treaty in their migrations and are caught
by Japanese high seas salmon fisheries there.
Much dissension has arisen from this treaty in respect to its
abstention "principle" as between Japan on the one hand and
Canada and the United States on the other. The Japanese have
not admitted any validity to abstention as a principle. At the
expiration of the original period of the treaty (1963) the Japanese
gave notice of desire to renegotiate. This renegotiation is still in
process. Japan has not given notice of its abbrogation, although
they could have at any time during the past seven years.
The third of these treaties is, in some respects, the most
interesting. The history of the Japanese salmon fisheries on the
Russian Siberian coast can be traced back to. the 1880's. From
the end of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-1905 to 1928 the
Japanese were dominant in this fishery. From 1928 to the
outbreak of World War I I there were annual negotiations between
the countries over this fishery. Japan, of course, lost all rights in
these fisheries at the end of World War II, including those of
Sakhalien and the Kuriles. Surprisingly, the Japanese surged back
strongly into the Asiatic salmon fisheries after about 1952 by high
seas netting from both land-based -stations on Hokkaido and from
mother ships. The consequence was a decline in the salmon runs
to the Siberian rivers. 70
At the United Nations sponsored Conference on the
Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas held in Rome
in 1955, and the meeting of the International Law Commission
which followed directly thereafter (in both of which the Soviet
70. See generally H. KASAHARA, FISHERIES RESOURCES OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN
(1961).
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Union participated) it was obvious that a new tenent of
international law was developing. This was to the effect that a
coastal country had a right to protect resources off its coast from
being overfished by others, even through unilateral action in some
situations .71
On February 1956, a Moscow radio broadcast abruptly
stated that salmon fishing in the Northwest Pacific would be
restricted between May 15 and September 15, 1956. Permits from
the Soviet Ministry of Fisheries would be needed to catch salmon
in these waters. The regulation was aimed at restricting the catch
to 25 million fish, whereas the Japanese had already targeted a
catch of 100 million fish from this area for themselves alone.
Since Japan was still technically at war with the Soviet Union
negotiations were called for.
On May 15, 1956, (just in time for the-opening of the salmon
season) a long-range convention was concluded between Japan
and the U.S.S.R., which covered the northwest Pacific, the Bering
Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan. It established a
fisheries commission initially for the regulation of the salmon
fisheries, but in 1958 regulation of the king crab and herring
fisheries was added to the responsibilities of the joint commission.
The Commission thus set up was essentially a negotiating
body, and the annual sessions have been marked by hard and
prolonged bargaining, often ending in a deadlock at the
Commission level and requiring decision at the ministerial level."
There is no doubt that the Soviet-Japanese Fisheries
Convention was forced upon Japan, but by the time the
Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas wis negotiated at Geneva in 1958, the
method used by Russia to do this was incorporated into the Law
of the Sea. Interestingly enough, neither the Soviet Union nor
Japan has ratified that convention.
It is also worthy of note that in 1966, when it became
possible for Japan to withdraw from the Soviet-Japanese Fisheries
Convention, it not only did not do so but the Foreign Minister
71. See Report of the international Law Commission Covering the work of its Eighth
Session. I1 GOAR Supp. 9, at 1, U.N. Doe. A/3159 (1956).
72. See Mathison & Bevan, supra note 35.
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of Japan publicly stated that the Convention was working well as
far as Japan was concerned.
H. Fishing Rights Agreements
In the last decade (since the end of the 1960 Conference on
the Law of the Sea) there has been a trend among nations to claim
either a 12-mile limit to the territorial sea or a 12-mile breadth
of exclusive fishery jurisdictions. Problems have also arisen
among the nations respecting the definition of the living resources
of the continental shelf, as set out in the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf.
To settle these problems negotiations through normal
diplomatic channels have been employed with general success. The
bilateral agreements (in some cases multilateral) are too numerous
to discuss here, but some instances may be mentioned as
examples.
A general agreement was reached among Iceland and the
countries fishing on its continental shelf, giving Iceland broader
exclusive jurisdiction (12 miles in most areas, and a little more in
others). This has continued in agreements among the other
countries of the Northeast Atlantic in establishing a 12-mile
exclusive fishery limit as among themselves, with a gradual
phasing out of historic fishing rights within that limit. Similar
adjustments have been made under separate agreements among
the United States, Canada, Mexico, Japan, between Mexico and
Guatemala, between Thailand and Malaysia, etc.
The United States has negotiated separate special agreements
with U.S.S.R. respecting the fisheries of the latter on both the east
and west coasts of the United States. These are renegotiated
annually and include rights both within and outside the United
States 12-mile fishery zone. A similar, but quite different,
agreement was negotiated between the United States and Poland
in 1969, covering the Polish fisheries off the eastern seaboard of
the United States.
The United States has negotiated other different and separate
agreements with both U.S.S.R. and Japan respecting the crab
fisheries of the Northeast Pacific on the United States'
continental shelf. Both agreements are renegotiated annually or
biennially to reduce Russian and Japanese fishing efforts on these
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species in that area. It is interesting that the same result is flowing
in both cases despite the fact that, while Russia recognizes these
crabs as being creatures of the continental shelf, and thus subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, Japan does not.
Other separate agreements covering fishery jurisdiction
matters have been concluded between Mexico and Japan,
U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Japan,
Australia and Japan, Mauretania and Japan, Brazil and Japan,
Argentina and Japan, etc.
73
This line of diplomatic activity has been most useful in
adjusting differences of modest importance in fisheries jurisdiction
affairs among nations, and in resolving disputes over these affairs
before they became magnified to levels requiring strong
diplomatic, or military, solutions.
III. SUMMARY
Eight different types of international fishery bodies,
commissions, and agreements involving about 24 such
organizations and a dozen or so agreements otherwise, have been
examined in a cursory fashion, and evaluated subjectively as to the
success of their efforts. Perhaps some general comments can be
justified.
I. There is general agreement among nations that fishery
resources should not be over-fished and that they should be
conserved. There is no objection among the nations to a definition
of conservation as the "aggregate of the measures rendering
possible the optimum sustainable yield from resources so as to
secure the maximum supply of food and other marine products."
This is agreed to in principle somewhat more enthusiastically than
it is in practice.
2. Conservation cannot be accomplished in respect to a
stock of fish unless certain scientific facts are known. These
include the rate of recruitment to the fish stock, its rate of growth,
the rate of natural mortality and the rate of fishing mortality.
These facts need to be in hand and understood before either the
point (or area) of maximum sustainable physical yeild or of
73. See Windlay, International Practices Regarding Traditional Fishing Privilege of
Foreign Fishermen in Zones of Extended Maritime Jurisdiction, 63 AmI. J. INT'L L. 490
(1969).
[Vol. 7
THEOR Y AND PRACTICE
maximum net economic yield can be calculated. Until there is
close agreement among national negotiators on this scientific
basis, the negotiations are unlikely to be fruitful.
74
3. Several different systems of arriving at agreed scientific
views on these matters have developed among the nations. The
ICES system works well in an area such as the Northeast Atlantic
where there are numerous competent fishery scientists, and each
nation has one or more on its team. It is unlikely to work well in
regions of the developing world where all national sections do not
have well trained fishery scientists. The ICNAF system works,
apparently, with about the same practical success as the ICES
system under similar circumstances. How it will work in the
developing world remains to be seen as the International Atlantic
Tuna Commission comes into effect. It can be predicted that it
will not work in that instance unless the Commission is provided
with competent scientific staff which is neutral as to national
economic interest, or until the members of the Commission that
do not have competent scientific staff of their own are provided
with such. One nation simply cannot be expected to accept the
economic neutrality of scientists employed by another nation.
The IHFC system, where the Commission hires its own
investigative staff, has worked very well in the case of the
International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission and the
International Halibut Fisheries Commission, where the cost is
born equally by the inember countries. It is showing signs of
breaking down in the case of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission, where it has worked very well to date, but where
both the major user of the resource is becoming reluctant to put
up as much investigative funds as are needed. This is also
becoming the case with the principal smaller user.
Where there are strong scientific organizations in all the
national sections, as in the Soviet-Japanese Northwest Pacific
Convention, not very much mechanism besides a negotiating table
seems to be necessary to make a conservation apparatus work
internationally.
In the absence of adequate scientific strength in the national
agencies or sections, the ICES approach has little chance of
74. See generally D. CUSHING, FISHERIES BIOLOGY, A STUDY IN POPULATION
DYNAMICS (1968).
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working. It has not yet been very productive in the FAO system
of Regional Fisheries bodies. It might well be that in the
developing world, where experienced fishery scientists are rare,
and used mostly for administrative purposes where they are
available, the provision of a staff of scientists to the Commission
itself, as in IATTC, would work satisfactorily. Yet the rub has
been money-the developing countries do not have it. To date
FAO has not been provided with adequate funds to staff such
bodies. This is at least one reason why its Regional Fisheries
Councils and Commissions have not been more effective. The
United Nations Development Program is beginning (1970) an
experiment in providing funding under such conditions for the
Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission. It is still too early to
estimate success or failure. Also it is not always the case that
foreign scientists are welcome indefinitely in developing countries.
In instances where faith is lacking in the scientific apparatus
attached to a particular fishery body an outside body of experts
can be retained to settle a particular dispute, as in the case of the
International Commission on Whaling. This obviously must be an
ad hoc arrangement and money must be provided from some
source to pay the cost.
Accordingly, there appear to be several satisfactory
mechanisms tested for attaining agreement on the scientific bases
of a particular fishery conservation problem. It does not appear
on the surface that any one type of mechanism is greatly superior
to another. All need money to work, both to do the research and
to support the scientists who are needed to evaluate the results.
4. While it takes time and costs money to attain the
scientific basis for conservation regulation, this is not the critical
part of the problem. The roadblock to conservation normally is
reduced to a question of division of the wealth created by the joint
conservation efforts. In the International Pacific Salmon Fishery
Commission, the catch is divided equally between the two
members. In the Fur Seal Convention the yield from the rookeries
is divided by proportions agreed to in the convention. In the
Soviet-Japanese Northwest Pacific Convention, the hard
bargaining sessions each year, conducted with considerable
acrimony and settled in amity, appear to be tending toward an
amicable division of the catch as among those two nations, but
great animosity toward new entrants, such as South Korea. A
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number of bilateral, annually negotiated, agreements have been
made among numerous nations to deal with special problems in
this area, and this practice seems to be working rather well.
In the case of the Halibut Commission there has been no
attempt to divide catch between the two nations involved. There
has been no controversy, except a belligerent approach by both
nations to new entrants. In the IATTC the same situation exists,
but it is not clear that this will remain satisfactory to the member
nations as fishing effort in the area grows and greater restriction
of its use becomes necessary. There has not been much
belligerence against new entrants (Japan, Canada, and now
Korea).
Efforts to exclude nations from fisheries on the high seas
through novel theory, as with the South Pacific Commission and
the International Commission for the North Pacific Fisheries, do
not appear to be very effective in a continuing manner. The South
Pacific apparatus has not excluded foreign fishermen from that
area yet and the North Pacific system appears to be held together
under a rather delicate power and fishery balance among Japan,
Russia, Canada and the United States in that region. Whether it
will survive the thrust of new entrants (just now, Korea) remains
to be seen.
In ICNAF, ICES and IWC, real over-fishing problems exist
which are well known, but have not yet been susceptible of
treatment. There is little disagreement left concerning the scientific
facts. Lack of action to provide for conservation derives almost
solely from lack of agreement as to how to distribute the proceeds
of the conservation among the nations. Within the past two years
real accomplishment has been initiated in respect to all three of
these problem areas, and it may well turn out that existing
mechanisms will be satisfactory, when assisted from time to time
by normal diplomatic activity in respect to special problems as
they arise among the nations directly.
5. There is no agreed general formula by which sovereign
nations can distribute the proceeds of the conservation regimes in
which they are involved. Each instance where this has been done
so far has been the result of hard and long negotiations among
the directly affected nations. Initiation of these negotiations has
ordinarily been forced by sufficiently serious over-fishing to cause
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severe economic stress in the fishery, plus severe public reaction
to the wastage. World opinion is becoming less and less tolerant
of such wasteful nonsense, and is becoming increasingly easy to
mobilize. It is this which is slowly bringing sense to the remaining
whaling countries, not native acumen.
75
Heretofore, schemes of dividing such proceeds, as with
several situations in the North Pacific, have depended upon
agreement between nations presently fishing such resources, and
the absence of new entrants into the fishery. This appears to be a
less and less satisfactory basis to use. The rapid rise of nations in
fishing strength, including distant water fishing, is exemplified by
Taiwan, South Korea and Ghana, all of whom have advanced in
a very few years from strictly coastal fishers to strong distant
water fishers. Israel, Greece, United Arab Republic, Somalia,
Ceylon, Thailand, Singapore, Spain and Italy have been moving
similarly, and other countries are stirring.
Schemes of dividing the proceeds of conservation programs
among participants in the present fishery to the exclusion of new
entrants appear to be less tenable in the future than in the past,
because improved fishery technology is available to all countries
and is being rapidly adopted by many, often through the
assistance of FAO, United Nations Development Program,
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or other
international aid schemes.
6. The past record indicates that conservation schemes are
put into effect more rapidly when the scientific bases of the
problem are known and agreed upon. There is no indication from
past practice that conservation schemes will be adopted in the
absence of such agreed upon knowledge. While the capability to
obtain such information exists in most countries of the north
temperate zone this is not generally, the case in the tropics and
sub-tropics, which is where major international fisheries are
developing rapidly and where it is certain that others will develop
soon. The experience of Peru indicates that modern technology
can develop a fishery from almost a standing start to a situation
of maximum sustainable yield, or beyond, in as short a time as
six years-which is too short a time to train competent fisheries
scientists locally.




There is a positive need to provide developing nations with
expertise in fishery conservation science and practice. In the long
run this must be accomplished by training native experts.
However, this is a long process and fishery problems will seldom
await its completion. In the short run this can be circumvented
temporarily by providing expatriate scientists either on the staff
of local agencies, or seconded from elsewhere (such as by FAO),
or on the staff of an international commission to which the nation
is a member (as in LATTC).
The practical situation in the world is that developing nations
do not have the money to hire expatriate fishery scientists to meet
their needs, and often they do not want to do so if they have the
money. FAO cannot furnish the expatriate fishery scientists where
needed for free, and it is forced to use what scientists it has to
develop more fisheries. Nations operating distant water fisheries
into the tropics and sub-tropics show no inclination to provide
further examples, such as LATTC, where the distant water fishing
country pays most of the cost of supporting an independent and
neutral scientific staff for an international fishery commission to
which the developing countries belong and have equal voice and
vote in policy determination.
7. The United States has an enviable record in high seas
fishery conservation to date. It supports international fishery
commissions in all of the major fisheries in which its flag vessels
participate with flag vessels of other nations. It has been energetic
in pressing for rational international fishery practices as well in
fisheries where it does not operate with its own flag vessels, both
specifically as in the case of the International Commission on
Whaling, and generally as in the international actions that led to
the 1958 Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas.
The moving times and needs have now outstripped United
States' policy and action in this field. In the past 10 years the
thrust of development in the United States fish business has been
away from the use of United States flag vessels to the
establishment of fishing ventures in other countries, using the
nationals and vessels of other countries in procuring the raw
materials for its market. This has been accompanied by solely
owned and joint ventures in foreign countries that market their
products abroad, and in the country where located, as well as in
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the United States. A measure of this tremendous development is
the fact that in 1968 nearly 76.2 percent of the aquatic products
used in the United States came from abroad.7
These imported fish and fish products are considered by the
United States government as being of foreign origin, whereas
much of it is the product of United States industry working
abroad. There is little realization of the vast collecting networks
for tuna, shrimp, lobsters, fishmeal, frozen fish blocks and other
products that have been established in nearly all parts of the world
ocean by United States industry. This has been a major factor,
particularly, in the rapidly developing fisheries of the tropics and
sub-tropics, and the southern hemisphere generally, where the
most urgent fishery conservation and jurisdiction problems are
arising. The fishing industry of Japan has been moving in the
same direction. Besides being the second largest fishing country in
the world, Japan has now become a major importer. Estimates are
that by 1977 it will consume a third more fish than it catches."
Although this rapid development of fisheries in the
developing nations is strictly in accord with general United States
foreign policy it has been largely ignored by policy makers in the
United States government and has not been incorporated much
into United States policy or ractions in this field.
In the United States government the prime fishery function
lies in the Department of the Interior. Its fishery scientists and
experts have been unable to follow the U.S. fish industry abroad
with the flexibility it uses to attend to the domestic activity of the
industry. The foreign aspects of fisheries are handled by a half
dozen sections of the Department of State (Office of Special
Assistant of the Secretary of State for Fisheries and Wildlife,
Office of the Science Advisor, individual desk officers, USAID,
United Nationals section, etc.) with little or no relation to the
activity of United States industry either at home or abroad. The
prime United Nations fishery function is in FAO. Policy
respecting FAO activities is dominated in the United States
government by the Department of Agriculture, which has been
reluctant historically to support fishery activities in FAO.
76. See United States Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Fisheries of the United States,
C.F.S. no. 500 (1969).
77. See generally Shinsuisan Sohuko, Report of the Director General, Japanese
Fishery Agency, on Need to Increase Fishery Resource Base (1970).
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Environmental ocean research in the United Nations family is
mainly the responsibility of UNESCO and this is related very
slightly to fishery activity in the United States government or in
FAO. Environmental atmospheric research in the United Nations
family is mainly the responsibility of the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO), which is only slightly related to fishery
research and development in FAO or ocean research in
UNESCO. In the United States government prime responsibility
for policy in WMO rests in the Department of Commerce.
The upshot of all of this is that United States fishery policy
and activity has not been able to follow United States industry
policy and activity into the outside world. It is ineffective in West
Africa, the Southwest Atlantic, and Western Indian Ocean, etc.,
where United States industry is active, where important supplies
for the United States market originate, and where jurisdictional
and conservation disputes over fisheries disturb the peace of
nations."8
8. The Soviet Union has also been vigorous in joining
international fishery bodies and working toward the rational
management of the resources its fishermen use. It is the most
vigorously expanding fishing nation that uses its own flag vessels
for its fish production. It is presently involved in most of the areas
of the world ocean where jurisdiction and conservation problems
over fisheries exist and are arising. The planned doubling of its
ocean fish production in the next few years will exacerbate existing
problems and create many new ones.
Soviet fishery conservation policy has been materially
hampered in its implementation by the fact that it does not belong
to FAO and is thus excluded from the prime area of United
Nations fishery activity, and the fact that it is politically
unwelcome ashore in many areas of the world. This is posing
enormous problems in international fishery practice.
9. The other very large fishing country that uses principally
its own flag vessels in producing fish is Japan. Until very recently
Japan has been reluctant to engage either in fishery conservation
research or to admit that the fishing effort of its vessels contribute
78. See Hearings on "A More Effective Use of Good from the Sea by the United
States and Man" Before the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong.
1st Sess. 1110 (1969).
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materially to over-fishing in any area of the world. It has bent its
efforts largely to the development of fisheries, which is where most
of its fishery money still goes. It is still reluctant to provide fishery
research money to international fishery bodies and commissions,
preferring to depend uniquely on the findings of its own scientists
and little regarding the possibility that other nations, particularly
in the developing world, may have difficulty in accepting the
economic neutrality of Japanese scientists.
10. The nations of Western Europe are now expanding their
fishing effort out of the Northeast Atlantic throughout the
Atlantic and into the Western Indian Ocean. This expansion has
been particularly vigorous down the coast of West Africa."
These nations have supported their national fishery agencies
modestly in the past, and the international fishery bodies in which
they are principally involved (ICES, ICNAF, International
Commission on Whaling) even more so. This has been
particularly true of the Mediterranean countries of Europe where
some of the most vigorous development of distant water fishing
in the world is now taking place.
These nations have also generally favored the use of ICES as
their chosen scientific instrument in dealing with more distant area
problems where their industries were moving, and have shown a
reluctance to see the competence of FAO Fisheries Department,
or other international fishery bodies, develop strength in this field.
I1. The developing countries are adjacent to the sea areas
where intensified fishing effort, both local and distant water, is
creating new fishery conservation problems most rapidly and most
profusely. Generally speaking, they have few native fishery
scientists, weak domestic fishery agencies, and a much greater
interest in developing new fish production rather than thinking of
conserving the resources that make the production possible. All
are short of funds of all kinds, but particularly of foreign
exchange with which to hire, or support the activities of, foreign
scientists. They press for FAO and United Nations Development
Program to support the development of their fisheries, not the
79. See Chapman, Some Problems and Prospects for the Harvest of Living Marine
Resources to the Year 2000, April 1, 1970 (unpublished paper presented to a UNITAR
Symposium).
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research required for conservation management. This puts a
constant and heavy drain on slender FAO resources.
12. The economists who now rail at the efforts of successful
international regimes aimed at maximizing the physical yield from
high seas fisheries resources because these bodies have not adopted
the criterion of maximizing the net economic yield from the
fisheries appear to me to have missed the present urgent point.
There is no question but what there is validity to the
contention that the wastage of fishing effort used beyond the point
of maximum net economic yield should be avoided. It appears to
me, however, that this is a second order problem that is so
difficult to solve from the political and diplomatic standpoint that
it should not be tackled seriously until the conservation, that is,
maximizing the physical yield, problem is a little better in hand.
It needs to be kept in mind that over-fishing from the
standpoint of physical yield is always economically wasteful and
in cases like whaling can be disastrous to the industry.
Approximately the same sort of research and knowledge of
resources, ocean and fishing effort is needed to solve either the
problem of maximizing physical yield or economic yield. As
difficult as it is to fund this research for attaining the objective
of physical conservation it is, at the present time, practically
impossible to seek such funds on the basis of maximizing the net
economic yield.
13. There is great ferment in the world presently to
revolutionize the Law of the Sea, and particularly in favor of the
developing nations. This cannot fail to affect the conduct and
yield of the sea fisheries."0 What is generally overlooked is that not
only is the value of fish production from the world double that
of all petroleum, gas and other minerals from the seabed, but that
in the past decade the development of the fisheries of the
developing countries has been much more rapid than that of the
developed countries, and in 1968 slightly exceeded it absolutely.,
80. See Burke, Contemporary Legal Problems in Ocean Development, in TOWARDS
A BETrER USE OF THE OCEANS 13 (1969); Chapman, Concerning Fishery Jurisdiction and
the Regime of the Deep-Seabed, in TOWARD A BErER USE OF THE OCEANS 54 (1969);
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, supra note 28.
81. 26 Yearbook of Fishery Statistics, Catches and Landings for 1968, FAO, Rome
(1969); Chapman, Some Problems and Prospects for the. Harvest of Living Marine
Resources to the Year 2000, supra note 79.
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In 1958 the developing countries produced 8.2 million tons as
against 17.2 million tons by the developed countries. In 1968 they
produced 25.3 million tons as against 24.9 million tons for the
developed countries. It is unlikely that changing the present rules
will benefit the developing nations more than the present rules.
CONCLUSIONS
From these considerations the following conclusions seem
valid to me.
1. Fishing effort on the world ocean is growing more
rapidly than the means of its governance.
2. For the most part the international fisheries bodies and
commissions that now exist have contributed, each in its own
fashion, to mitigating disputes among the nations over fisheries,
and have contributed much to the growth of understanding of
ocean, resource, and fishing effort that is required to resolve such
diplomatic and political problems.
3. There is no form of such international body so far
developed that appears to be unique in its efficiency in dealing
with such problems. To the contrary, it would appear that such
bodies must be shaped to the existing political, economic and
diplomatic conditions in a particular sea area to be able to deal
effectively with such problems in such areas.
4. To understand how to deal with each such problem it is
necessary to
(a) delimit the geographic range of stock or stocks of fish
in question,
(b) measure the total catch by some convenient unit of time,
(c) measure the effort required to take the catch, and
(d) measure the rate of recruitment to the stock, the rate of
growth of the stock, and the rate or mortality of the stock. This
research costs money. It must be done by competent scientists
whose national bias can be eliminated as a factor in order to be
credible as a base of resource management.
5. By these means, agreement can be had on the amount of
fishing effort to be permitted in a particular fishery, within
reasonable limits, that will correspond to the maximum
sustainable physical yield from the resources involved.
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6. On the basis of such agreed determinations, it is possible,
but difficult, for nations to arrange among themselves a division
of the maximum sustainable yield. There is no general formula for
this and so far such divisions have been achieved only by
negotiations that took cognizance of all diplomatic relations
among the affected nations.
7. The developing nations, generally speaking, have neither
the resources, capability nor urge to do the research required for
determination of the scientific base. This must be done for them
through channels whose credibility is accepted by them. Included
in this category may be FAO bodies, or non-FAO bodies, in
which the developing nation has full voice or vote. It is never
likely to be obtained in bodies where the developing nation does
not have equal voice, whether that be a national or an
international agency.
8. The distant water fishing nations, and those nations like
the United States who depend upon foreign sources for their fish
supply, must accept financial and other responsibility for
husbanding the food resources of the world ocean if those
resources are to be productive in perpetuity, and if costly disputes
among nations over these issues are to be kept in hand.
9. This will probably not be effective in the long run
without a major overhaul of the United Nation's machinery for
dealing with ocean-oriented problems, of which fishery disputes
are the most numerous and vexing, but not the only ones. At the
very least the ocean activities of WMO, FAO, and UNESCO,
must be brought into better relations with each other. The funding
support for the whole United Nations ocean activity, in particular
that related to good from the sea, must be strengthened in a major
way.81
10. The United States government is unable at the present
time to bring its weight to bear on these problems in a manner
well suited to furthering United States objectives in the increased
use of the sea because responsibility for these activities is so
diffused among agencies of the United States. It is not at all able,
under its present organization, to incorporate the vigorous foreign
section of the United States fish industry into a furtherance of its
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objectives in this field."2
11. The objective of maximizing the net economic yield
from high seas fisheries is a second order problem of great
complexity for which no solution is at present evident either in the
international or the domestic field. It should be set aside until
more success is had with solving the first order
problem-maximizing the physical yield of food from the sea.
12. The major nations, at this stage of history, will not risk
war over fishery disputes nor will they justify major diplomatic
confrontations on these grounds. They will not protect their
distant-water vessels in their activities by force under any except
the most grave conditions. Accordingly, peaceful means must be
found for the settlement of these disputes if the industries are to
develop as desired. The only such means yet proven to be very
practical is that of scientists working together to solve the natural
history parts of the problems under some sort of formal or
informal international auspices, and the diplomats and
administrators using their agreed scientific results as a secure
foundation for their own negotiations of the political, economic
and social parts of the problems.
It is the scientific part of the apparatus that is not presently
being funded adequately to keep abreast of the accruing problemg.
Unless this funding, and this part of the apparatus, is
strengthened, a good deal of chaos on the sea is to be anticipated
and rather quickly.
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